Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 79
Issue 1 Symposium: Do Children Have the
Same First Amendment Rights as Adults?

Article 5

April 2004

The Speech-Enhancing Effect of Internet Regulation
Emily Buss

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the First Amendment Commons, Internet Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Emily Buss, The Speech-Enhancing Effect of Internet Regulation, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 103 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol79/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

THE SPEECH-ENHANCING EFFECT OF INTERNET
REGULATION
EMILY Buss*

Amitai Etzioni ends his analysis of regulations aimed at curtailing children's access to harmful speech with a call to "value children
more."1 While I share his willingness to remake the law to serve children better, I do not think his analysis does justice to children's complex interests in the realm of speech. Caught up in the absolutist
battle between "full" adult speech rights, on the one hand, and protection from harmful exposure, on the other, Etzioni embraces regulation in the name of protection. But a fuller account of the
relationship of authority among state, parent, and child suggests that
some state-imposed speech regulation may have a speech-enhancing,
rather than curtailing, effect for children. Because parents have near
absolute censoring authority over their children, regulations may inspire parents to relax their grip on their children's exploration of
ideas, even as they constrain adults' freedom somewhat. The best
justification for the regulations in question might, thus, be the state's
interest in shifting the balance of access to speech, modestly, away
from adults and in favor of children.
To a large extent, my disagreement with Etzioni is one of analysis rather than outcomes. I, too, think narrowly crafted regulation can
be appropriate in some contexts. But taking a speech-enhancing,
rather than a protective, approach to the development of these regulations affects the contours of these regulations. More significantly, a
pro-speech approach challenges the conventional assumption, embraced by Etzioni, that segregating adult and child access will maximize the interests of both. At least on the Internet, children's interest
in access to information may well be best served by linking their fate
with that of adults. While adults will suffer some speech loss from this
linked fate, children will gain considerably more.
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to William Buss, Geoffrey Stone, Cass
Sunstein, and David Strauss for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, to Shiela Beail for
her excellent research assistance, and to the Arnold and Frieda Shure Research Fund for its
financial support.
1. Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Childrenfrom Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2004).
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The Internet offers an especially salient context in which to consider this potential tension because of its special speech value to children. It is the gateway to an exceptional volume and variety of
information, accessible from anywhere at anytime. It is relatively easy
to use, allowing children who "enter" with no preexisting knowledge
or sophisticated questions to find their way to answers. For children,
it is also the best, most public, forum available for the free exchange
of ideas. Unlike adults, who have control over where they go, what
they do, and to whom they speak, children have very little opportunity for a free and public exchange of ideas. The Internet offers children a unique opportunity for the unstructured, unmonitored
exploration of information that is so valuable to the fostering of their
independent thinking.2
Of course, these virtues bring with them commensurate risks:
The volume and variety of information available on the Internet extends to much material that many find offensive, and the opportunity
for independent exploration offered makes it likely that children will
find their way (whether by design or by mistake) to these offensive
materials. Concerned with this potential, many parents will impose
restrictions on their children's Internet access that will dramatically
limit children's opportunity to explore the Internet's wealth of inoffensive information freely. To prevent that profound speech-limiting
effect, a state might choose to impose regulations that reduce children's access to the materials parents most reasonably fear.
I.

Two ENTANGLED LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

Two distinct bodies of law bear on our consideration of childprotective regulations of speech. The first is children's right to free
speech, protected by the First Amendment. The second is a system of
laws, constitutional and otherwise, that grant parents vast authority
over their children. The Due Process Clause shields this authority
from unwelcome state intervention, and the state affirmatively fosters
this authority through a host of laws that recognize parental authority
in specific contexts and hamper children's ability to resist it. These
two distinct bodies of law, governing children's speech rights and pa2. The Supreme Court has noted the value of this free exploration of ideas in the far more
limited environment of the school library. See Bd. of Educ. v. PICO, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982)
(celebrating students' ability to "'explore the unknown, and discover areas of interest and
thought not covered by the prescribed curriculum' (quoting Right to Read Def. Comm. v. Sch.
Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 (D. Mass. 1978))).
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rental authority, respectively, must be considered together to understand the stakes for children in the regulations in question.
A.

Children'sFirstAmendment Rights

The Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment
right to free speech, like other constitutional rights, applies to children as well as to adults.3 This right includes the right to speak, as well
as to hear and read the speech of others.4 This is not to say, however,

that the scope of children's speech protection is coextensive with that
of adults. Indeed, the Court has frequently relied upon the special
circumstances of childhood, and the special circumstances of the

child-specific school setting, to justify reducing the protection afforded to children's speech.'
Courts and commentators commonly offer two justifications,
both tied to children's ongoing development, for curtailing children's
speech rights. First, children's less developed capacities make them
less prepared to exercise speech rights, and second, their greater vul-

nerabilities increase the potential harm associated with certain
speech. As applied to the right to access information, immature capacities might lead children to make bad judgments about what to
read and how to assess what they read, whereas children's special
vulnerabilities could increase the risk that this access to information
will impose psychological and developmental harm. 6 These two justi3. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4. PICO, 457 U.S. at 866-68 ("[J]ust as access to ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner, such access
prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious
society in which they will soon be adult members."); see also Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging
Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223 (1999) (arguing that
existing constitutional doctrine supports the recognition of mature minors' access to information
without parental consent).
5. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) ("we have recognized that
even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms, 'the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults ... ') (quoting Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
271-73 (1988) (concluding that a student newspaper produced in the context of a journalism
class should be afforded only minimal First Amendment protection); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688-90 (1986) (concluding that the First Amendment did not prevent the
school from disciplining a student for his use of vulgarity during his speech at a student assembly).
6. In FCCv. Pacifica Foundation,438 U.S. 726, 757-58 (1978), Justice Powell explains in a
concurring opinion:
"A child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, [390 U.S.] at
649-650 (Stewart, J., concurring in result). Thus, children may not be able to protect
themselves from speech which, although shocking to most adults, generally may be
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fications for regulation address different sides of the rights/interest
balance. Where child-specific harms weigh more heavily in favor of
regulation than do the parallel adult harms, children's diminished

capacities lighten the countervailing speech interest that weighs so
heavily against regulation where adult speech is at issue.
Etzioni considers both of these justifications and concludes that,

together, they provide strong support for certain forms of Internet
regulation. While I am in no position to second-guess his conclusions
about child-specific harm, I disagree with his conclusion that chil-

dren's immaturity qualifies their interest in speech. To the contrary,
the process of development gives special value to children's speech,
and, particularly, children's access to information.

Etzioni concludes that exposure to certain information and images, particularly those depicting violence, is, indeed, harmful to children. This is not, as he notes, the speech targeted by Congress's many

attempts to regulate Internet speech. 7 In contrast, he suggests that
there is no convincing evidence suggesting that children are harmed
by exposure to the sort of sexually indecent materials that are the

focus of these regulations.8 While noting that this lack of support
might be due, in part, to the difficulty of studying the question effectively, he concludes that, absent such support, regulation of access to
these materials may not be justified. Because the empirical link between exposure to media violence and aggressive behavior is much

stronger, he concludes that the state has a strong interest in controlling children's access to these materials. As I will argue later, this
avoided by the unwilling through the exercise of choice. At the same time, such speech
may have a deeper and more lasting negative effect on a child than on an adult.
7. See Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 502, 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a), (d) (2000) (prohibiting knowing transmission of obscene, indecent, or patently offensive images to recipients
under eighteen years of age); Child Online Protection Act § 1403, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000) (prohibiting the display of sexually explicit material deemed harmful to minors on the World Wide
Web); Children's Internet Protection Act, 20 U.S.C. § 9134, 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000) (conditioning libraries' receipt of federal funding on their use of filters designed to screen out sexually
explicit materials deemed harmful to minors).
8. Etzioni, supra note 1, at 38-39; see also COMM. TO STUDY TOOLS & STRATEGIES FOR
& THEIR APPLICABILITY TO OTHER
PROTECTING KIDS FROM PORNOGRAPHY
INAPPROPRIATE

INTERNET

CONTENT,

NATIONAL

RESEARCH

COUNCIL,

YOUTH,

PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET 155 (Dick Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2002) (noting the lack of empirical evidence on the impact of sexually explicit material on children). This
is surely, in part, because these effects are harder to study than the effects of exposure to depictions of violence, which are a mainstay of the television programming and video games to which
children in many households have been continually exposed. See id. at 149 (noting that "because
our society has more permissive attitudes about allowing young people to view violent material
than about allowing them to see sexually explicit material," the impact of exposure to violence
has been more thoroughly studied).
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straightforward reliance on empirical evidence is less compelling if
the purpose of regulation is to relax parents' access constraints, rather
than to protect children from harmful exposure. To achieve that purpose, what matters most is parents', rather than scientists', view of
harm.
Bolstering his conclusion that certain access regulations are justified is Etzioni's conclusion that children lack the maturity to exercise
speech rights in a manner worthy of full constitutional protection. He
concludes:
Children- according to practically all of a huge social science literature and elementary common sense-are different from adults
in that they have few of the attributes of mature persons that justify
respecting their choices. Children have not yet formed their own
preferences, have not acquired basic moral values, do not have the
information needed for sound judgments, and are subject to ready
manipulation by others. 9
While Etzioni acknowledges that these deficits are particularly
great in younger children, he relies on this argument to support the
regulation, albeit lesser regulation, of adolescent speech and access as
well. This suggestion that adolescents' speech and access is less worthy of protection than adults' is a serious mistake, one that fails to
account for the role the law itself plays in fostering children's incomplete development.
Children's ongoing development compromises the value of their
speech in some respects, but it enhances its value in others. Indeed,
because speech itself plays such an important role in development, it
has a special value to children largely absent for adults. Children, and
particularly adolescents, are heavily engaged in the process of identity
formation, the process of working through what they believe on matters of both fact and principle. 10 While parental upbringing plays a
large role in shaping this identity, children increasingly turn to independent, nonparental sources as they grow up." Development, then,
9. Etzioni, supra note 1, at 46.
10. See JANE KROGER, IDENTITY IN ADOLESCENCE: THE BALANCE BETWEEN SELF AND
OTHER 21, 46 (2d ed. 1996) (noting the importance of adolescence for identity development).
11. See Ritch C. Savin-Williams & Thomas J. Berndt, Friendship and Peer Relations, in AT
THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 277, 278-79 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R.
Elliott eds., 1990) ("[B]y allowing oneself to become vulnerable before a coequal, adolescent
friends share with one another their most personal thoughts and feelings, become sensitive to
the needs and desires of others, and, in the process, acquire a deep understanding of the other
and the self."); Michael D. Berzonsky, A Process Perspective on Identity and Stress Management,
in ADOLESCENT IDENTITY FORMATION 193, 198 (Gerald R. Adams et al. eds., 1992) (finding
that adolescents actively engaged in the process of sorting out their identities look to others for
ideas about the alternatives to consider).
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points children toward the marketplace of ideas to work out who they
are and what they think.
More than at any other life stage, adolescents are programmed to
speak and listen, to engage in the marketplace of ideas, in a genuine
search for truth. Children enter the marketplace open to persuasion
and prepared to "try on" various viewpoints and characterizations of

facts. Adults, in contrast, may be less qualified, by virtue of their
more complete identity development, to profit from their participation. While their greater wisdom and competence may enhance the
value of the speech adults bring to the marketplace, their prospect of

persuading one another can be expected to dwindle with age.12
The fact that children are likely to make "errors" along the way,
due to their incomplete development, shorter supply of experience,

and moral immaturity, is not a reason, in itself, to devalue their market participation. Indeed, healthy development depends upon an opportunity to practice, to engage in a process of trial and error, that
can facilitate the development of self-knowledge, a better sense of the
world, and greater moral understanding. While this experimentation
will have developmental value in many contexts, mistakes in other
contexts can produce serious lasting consequences, such as babies,
health problems, and jail.,3 Compared to most arenas of choice, the
harm associated with speech "mistakes" will be tame. Speech, then,
has a special value to children as a practice ground for choice that is
relatively, if not absolutely, safe.14

12. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE
L.J. 71 (2000) (discussing the political and legal implications of empirical data suggesting that
deliberations among adults tend to intensify already held views, rather than to inspire reflection,
qualification, or reconsideration).
13. Juvenile criminal offending offers a good example of a context in which developmentally inspired experimentation can produce serious harmful consequences. While sociologists
and psychologists commonly conclude that some experimentation with law breaking is developmentally healthy (and common) in adolescence, the cost of getting caught can be profound.
Cf Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-PersistentAntisocial Behavior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 692 (1993) (suggesting that the bulk of
adolescent offending, which she calls "adolescent-limited" offending, reflects a healthy desire of
adolescents to bridge a gap between biological maturity and social immaturity); EDWIN M.
SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTERVENTION: RETHINKING THE DELINQUENCY PROBLEM (1973)
(arguing that law enforcement response to adolescent offending fosters deviance in otherwise
developmentally healthy adolescents by shaping their identities in a destructive direction).
14. Cf. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 91-92
(1982) (calling for a legal approach to adolescence that maximizes adolescents' opportunity to
practice exercising their rights and assuming responsibilities, while minimizing the harm caused
by their mistakes).
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Children's ongoing development may enhance the value of their
speech in a third respect. Their ongoing process of "becoming"15 gives
them the opportunity to develop habits that can carry into adulthood
when approaches to deliberation, no less than the substance of our
views, become more fixed. Perhaps habits of discourse instilled in
adolescents can alter the adult speakers and listeners we become.
Affording children opportunities to seek out dissenting viewpoints,

and to explore issues broadly, may translate into a better functioning
marketplace for adults.

Etzioni assumes, as do most, that whatever value we afford children's speech weighs against state regulation. But this need not be so.
Because children's access to speech is in the tight control of their parents, regulations that encourage parents to loosen that control are
likely to yield significant speech benefits for children.
B.

Parents' Legal Authority Over Their Children'sSpeech

The state gives parents broad authority to control the choices of
their children, and it backs them up with judicial orders and police
enforcement when children balk. 16 It enforces children's dependence
by withholding voting rights, narrowing work opportunities, and preventing them from entering binding agreements. The state further
reduces children's choices by forcing them to attend school for the
bulk of their day, and by compelling them to digest a formal curriculum of the state's or parent's choosing. Of course, all of these restric-

tions are imposed for their own good, and it is not my intention, here,
to question the efficacy of those limitations. Rather, I suggest that we
must take these substantial "baseline" infringements on children's
freedom into account when we assess their interest in additional regulation.

15. Etzioni, supra note 1, at 46 (quoting DAVID ARCHARD & COLIN M. MACLEOD, Introduction, in THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN (David Archard & Colin M.
Macleod eds., 2003)).
16. When children refuse to obey the rules imposed by their parents, parents can invoke
the assistance of the courts through their "status offense" jurisdiction, and of the police, should
children attempt to run away. When a child violates a court order directing her compliance with
parental rules, her status offense can be converted to a charge of juvenile delinquency. See
Harry J. Rothgerber, Jr., The Bootstrapping of Status Offenders: A Vicious Practice, 1 KY.
CHILD. RTS. J. 1, 2 (1991) (discussing "the process whereby a juvenile court, either through its
contempt power or by means of an escape petition, elevates a status offender to a public offender ('delinquent') for the same noncriminal misbehavior which brought the child before the
Court in the first place").
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The state exercises far greater indirect control over children's access to speech by delegating authority to parents than it exercises
directly in the form of speech-qualifying regulations. Parents' control
over children's access to information outside of school hours is near
absolute. Parents can refuse to allow any computer access, install
"white list" filters that only allow access to an approved list of websites, or insist on looking over their children's shoulders whenever
they log on. They can prohibit their children's use of libraries and
other public spaces that offer access to information, or can insist on
accompanying them whenever they go. All such control, as exercises
of parental authority, will be backed up by the state.
The state further controls children's access to speech through
compulsory schooling laws, which dedicate most of the child's day to
school and school-related activities. By requiring children's participation in a prescribed curriculum, the state monopolizes the child's
speaking and information-gathering hours. These are hours in which
children's speech and access are heavily constrained, in part by stateimposed regulations (which the Constitution allows), and in part by
parental choice (which the Constitution protects). In all aspects of the
school day characterized as curricular, the Court has said, children's
speech protection is minimal,17 and the heavy control schools generally exercise over that curriculum substantially limits children's
speech opportunities within it. Moreover, should the state choose to
afford children considerable freedom of speech within that curriculum, the Constitution affords parents authority to veto those choices
18
by removing their children from public school.
Viewing children's opportunities to access information through
the lens of all relevant laws, we see the following: The First Amendment protects children's access to speech against some forms of direct
state regulation. States nevertheless undermine children's ability to
access information through a web of laws that affords parents strong
authority over their children and renders children dependent on their
parents. Moreover, parents' own constitutional rights prevent the
state from qualifying parents' censorship control by requiring parents
to allow a certain level of access. The state could, presumably, enhance children's access to information by eliminating its laws that
reinforce parental authority altogether, but such an approach would
17. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
18. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a state law requiring
all children to attend public schools).
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sweep far too broadly. The state might well conclude that children's
interests are generally served by subjecting them to their parents'
authority, but disserved when that authority is exercised to severely
curtail children's access to speech. To enhance children's access to
speech, then, without undermining parental authority, the state must
win the confidence of parents loath to relinquish informational control.
Recognizing the considerable value of speech, and particularly
access, to adolescents, the state might impose regulations aimed at
screening out the material most worrisome to parents, in order to
encourage parents to allow their children greater freedom in their
exploration of information overall. I am not suggesting that this has
been identified as a state interest, but, rather, that it could, and perhaps should, be. The best argument for Internet regulation, in the
absence of any convincing showing of harm, is a pro-speech argument: Without the regulation, some children's independent access to
this wealth of information is likely to be sharply curtailed.
This conception of parent-state collaboration parallels the more
conventional conception embraced by Etzioni and the Court, but it
runs in the opposite direction. Where the conventional conception
recognizes the state's interest in helping parents protect their children
from harmful speech, 19 I am adding the state's interest in helping parents avoid overprotection. 0 Parents, acting alone, have limited
knowledge and crude tools available to them to control their children's access to Internet speech. Most crude among these is the simple prohibition of Internet use, or at least any use outside their view.
Moreover, any visible exercise of censoring or monitoring authority
by parents will compromise children's experience of independence in
accessing the Internet. The state, in contrast, is in a better position to
moderate access control by offering some protection independent of
parental involvement. State-imposed restrictions, if sufficient to satisfy parents, will facilitate children's exploration of the Internet outside the reach of their parents' comments and views.
Under this conception of rights, authorities, and interests, certain
regulations could be speech favoring-that is, designed to enhance
the speech interests of children overall. That is not to say that such
19. Etzioni, supra note 1, at 49; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
20. Of course, these two conceptions of state-parent collaboration are not necessarily in
conflict. The state might have an interest in helping both the parent who did too little (the harm
rationale), and the parent inclined to do too much (the enhanced speech rationale). As I will
argue later, however, the two rationales call for somewhat different solutions.
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regulations would enhance the access of every child, for some children, surely, would have full Internet access in the absence of regulation. The interest would be defined, then, to maximize speech access
of children in the aggregate, rather than each child in particular. This
conception, then, shifts the tension from adult speech against child
protection to adult speech against child speech, raising basic questions
about whose speech we should prefer.
Of course, my speech-speech conception invites a straightforward doctrinal objection: Even if children's speech interests are the
same or greater than those of adults, the First Amendment gives the
states no affirmative authority to advance those interests. The First
Amendment shields individuals (children and adults) from state infringement on speech; it does not create a right to state-provided opportunities for speech. But this lawyer's argument can be met with a
lawyerly response: The state infringes far more heavily on children's
freedom of speech by delegating heavy speech control to parents than
it does on adults by imposing certain specific regulations. These regulations, then, can be seen as the state's attempt to reduce the constraints it imposes, indirectly, on children's access. Indeed, the state's
other curtailments of children's freedom can be better justified if the
speech-suppressing effects of those curtailments are minimized.
Viewed in the context of the entire legal relationship among parent,
child, and state, these regulations impose modest speech infringements on adults to modestly diminish the speech infringements the
state poses, through parents, on children.
But I do not wish to give too much attention to this doctrinal
manipulation. Nor do I insist that First Amendment doctrine is particularly well designed to handle the problem I address. Rather, I
focus on an actual tension between two groups' speech interests, a
tension produced by the awkward intersection of many laws, constitutional and otherwise.
II. THE COMPETING SPEECH INTERESTS OF CHILDREN AND
ADULTS

The potential gains and losses to adult and child access associated with state intervention will vary considerably with context. After
arguing that children stand to gain much more than adults stand to
lose from the tailored regulation of the Internet, I will argue that
physically segregating adult and child access is likely to reduce those
gains to children considerably.
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The Special Value of Internet Access for Children

A strong argument can be made that the value to children of independent Internet access outweighs whatever loss of value to adults
would be associated with regulations designed to afford children that
independent access. The argument begins with the suggestion, set out
above, that children, particularly adolescents, have a special, developmental interest in the free exploration of ideas. As already discussed, the potential to engage in unfettered and expansive
exploration on the Internet makes it an especially suitable medium
for this developmental work. Moreover, the wealth of information
available to children in a successfully regulated world is vast, whereas
the information lost to adults, while significant, is minor by comparison. Finally, adults have far more comprehensive means available to
seek similar information elsewhere than do children, whose movements, finances, and schedule are controlled by the same people who
will tightly control their Internet access in the absence of state regulation.
The scope of the Internet access restrictions imposed on many
children in a regulation-free world can be expected to be far greater
than the scope of those restrictions imposed on adults (or on children
permitted full access) by well-tailored regulation. At worst, adults will
lose access to sexually explicit materials that do not qualify as obscene, but are widely viewed as offensive. Children, in contrast, may
lose access to the Internet altogether, or face severe curtailments on
the freedom with which they use it. Put more starkly, adults risk the
loss of a relatively small band of speech of questionable value,
whereas children risk the loss of a vast amount of speech, much of
high political, social, and scientific value. Moreover, where adults
would be left free, in the regulated world, to explore what remains
with abandon, many children still allowed access will be closely moni21
tored by their parents in an unregulated world.
While this comparative assessment is based, in part, on the sheer
volume of speech potentially lost and gained, and on the likely change
in the level of independence afforded child users, it also makes assumptions about the relative value of various forms of speech. While
First Amendment doctrine has resisted classifying sexually indecent
21. This is not to suggest that children's use of the Internet, in collaboration with their
parents, is less valuable than their independent use, but, rather, that both forms of use are
valuable, and the loss of either is a significant speech loss to children.
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speech as low-value speech,2 2 such a value assessment may be more
appropriate in this context, where speech interests are pitted against
one another. The question here is not, simply, whether access to this
sort of speech is worth protecting in the abstract, but whether it is
more or less worth protecting than children's access to speech of
more obvious political, scientific, and cultural value that this protection may prevent.
The greater value of children's Internet access derives, also, from
the relative scarcity of access opportunities for children when compared to those of adults. For children, Internet access in schools and
libraries may be the only means available to them to explore vast
bodies of information. Any other access to the Internet, or other
sources of comparable information, will be significantly controlled by
their parents: Their parents will determine whether there is Internet
access at home at all, and, if so, whether, when, and under what circumstances their children can use it. Parents control their children's
finances both directly (by controlling payment and allowance) and
indirectly, in collaboration with the state (by controlling their employment). Parents also control their children's movements and associations, further diminishing children's opportunities to seek out
information on their own. Adults, in contrast, have considerably
more, though surely not absolute, control over all these aspects of
their lives, and thus have far greater alternative access to the information in question. They can buy their own Internet access from home,
buy books and images, and even arrange associations to facilitate
23
access and exchange.
First Amendment analysis consistently takes account of this issue
of scarcity in considering the degree of the speech harm caused by
imposing regulations. Whether the Court is assessing the appropriateness of restricting radio broadcasts containing profanity or of imposing zoning constraints on "adult" theatres, or determining whether
a restriction on speech in a nonpublic forum is reasonable, the availability of alternative opportunities to speak and hear weakens the

22. See Jeffrey A. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 299
(1995) (noting that some members of the Court, but not a majority, would categorize nonobscene sexually explicit expression as low-value speech).
23. These alternatives are less available to adults of limited means, but here, again, the
relative picture is what matters. However limited adults' resources, and however constricted
adults' employment opportunities, they are far less limited than the resources and employment
opportunities of children. More to the point, these resources and opportunities are, relatively
speaking, far less in children's control.
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case for First Amendment protection.2 4 In our context, the relative
scarcity of children's access opportunities argues for favoring those
opportunities over the more replaceable access opportunities of
adults. While this argument about relative scarcity could be made in
all speech contexts, the argument is particularly strong in the Internet
context because of the special value to children of this form of access.
On the Internet, children may have more to gain from regulation
than adults have to lose. If we cannot protect children's independent

Internet access by other means, the state might be justified in imposing regulations designed to encourage parents to allow this access.
B.

The Risk of Segregated Access

If convinced that an unregulated Internet will inspire some parents to overregulate their children's Internet access, why not simply
segregate access, offering adults full access and children more re-

stricted (parent-friendly) access? If libraries are required to offer
children regulated Internet access and adults nonregulated access,

perhaps we can eliminate the speech-speech conflict, just as Etzioni
suggests we can eliminate the speech-protection conflict, through
segregation.2 But the shift in focus from child protection to child access raises a concern with this solution of segregation.
We can expect regulation of child-only access to be greater than
the regulation of all-user access. This is because, in unlinking adult

and child access, we distance regulation from the core of the First
24. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 n.28 (1978) (noting that adults
interested in hearing the words prohibited on the broadcast in question can "purchase tapes and
records or go to theaters and nightclubs," or listen to the radio at different hours); Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) ("There is no claim that distributors or exhibitors of adult films are denied access to the market or, conversely, that the viewing public is
unable to satisfy its appetite for sexually explicit fare. Viewed as an entity, the market for this
commodity is essentially unrestrained."); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672, 684-85 (1992) (reasonableness of Port Authority's prohibition of solicitation within
the airports was established, in part, by its allowance of solicitation on airport sidewalks, frequented by all but 3 percent of the airport users); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.,
433 U.S. 119, 131 (1977) (finding that the regulation of bulk mail distribution in prison was not
unreasonable, in part because "other avenues of outside informational flow by the [speaker]
remain available").
25. Etzioni, supra note 1, at 29 ("The first lesson that appears from the cases at hand, albeit
indirectly, is that if the goal is to protect children and not to curb adult access to speech, the
government should urge or require libraries to have separate computers for children and adults)
(emphasis in original); see also Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 758:
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind of speech to children may be limited
without also limiting willing adults' access to it. Sellers of printed and recorded matter
and exhibitors of motion pictures and live performances may be required to shut their
doors to children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults' access.
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Amendment protection. Adults are entitled to "full" access, children
to something less. Once the something less doesn't come at any cost
to adults, it is easier to define it more expansively.
Where the goal is protection, the zealous pursuit of regulation is
likely to serve the goal well. Child harm and adult speech are two
unrelated interests, both forced to compromise if they must be accommodated together. If disentangled, adult speech can be completely protected, and children's harm can be more aggressively
avoided. But where the interest at stake, for both children and adults,
is access to speech, unlinking the two risks overregulating the speech
access of children.
Ideal regulation would be just enough to encourage the average
(reasonable?) parent to relax her control. Unlinking children's access
from that of adults will make it too easy to give regulation-favoring
parents more. Indeed, segregated public access is likely to look more
like the sort of access protective parents might privately design for
their children, rather than like the more narrow regulation designed
to minimize intrusions on protected adult speech.

III.

APPROPRIATE REGULATION

Thus far, I have pitched my argument for regulation at a high
level of abstraction. Left to discuss are the sticky specifics: What sorts
of regulations, under this theory, would be appropriate? And how can
we assess the proper level of regulation, where parental attitudes and
actual behavior can be expected to vary dramatically? To these questions I offer no absolute answers, but rather an approach. Recognizing the potential speech loss to children in an unregulated world does
not dictate any particular regulatory solution, but rather alters how
we think of the stakes, and qualifies the speech-regulation dichotomy
that invites sweeping rejection of any such regulation.
The argument for access-enhancing regulation assumes a particular sort of parent-a parent willing to allow her child independent
Internet access if, and only if, that access does not include access to
certain offensive materials. Of course, there are other sorts of parents-parents who support their children's independent Internet access without qualifications, and parents who will insist on imposing
their own controls, regardless of what regulations are imposed by the
state. Among these two groups of parents (the most permissive and
the most protective), protective regulations will have no access-
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enhancing effects, and among the most permissive parents, such regulations will, in fact, reduce access somewhat.
Even among those parents willing to allow independent access
subject to regulation, the amount and type of regulation required to
relax their control will surely vary considerably. For this reason, we
should not expect to capture, in substantive terms, precisely "how
much" regulation is ideal. Rather, our aim of imposing just enough
regulation to relax the control of the average parent suggests a process of decision making-one that gives some deference to the legislative process as the best measure of aggregate parental attitudes, but
that provides for a judicial check to safeguard the speech interests at
stake.
Regulatory choices made through the legislative process can be
construed as a rough reflection of majority parental views. The reflection is not perfect because interest-group politics likely produce a
drafting process dominated by those most committed to imposing
regulations, and because even the purest democratic process will reflect the interests of voters other than parents. But no other measure
better approximates parental views, in the aggregate, than this majoritarian decision-making process. As the best, rough assessment of
parental viewpoints, such legislation is entitled to some deference in
determining what level of regulation is necessary to inspire confidence in the average parent.
Deference to legislative decision making on this subject should
not, of course, be absolute, and it would remain the courts' job to
weigh the potential gain in access to children of more cautious parents against the loss in access that the regulations would impose on
adults, as well as children of more permissive parents. If the aim were
maximum access in some absolute sense, the courts might require
regulations to leave adults free to arrange for unregulated access for
themselves and their children in certain settings. If the aim were to
maximize the number of children able to access speech of high social,
scientific, and literary value, the courts might allow regulations that
censored certain content in all contexts, thereby encouraging parents
to liberalize their children's access to the Internet in all settings.
The Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"), 26 recently upheld by the Supreme Court without regard to its potential value for
children's speech, 27 offers a useful example of how courts might take
26. See 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000).
27. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
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children's potential for enhanced access into account in assessing the
appropriateness of Internet regulation. Because CIPA only requires
the use of filters in public settings (schools and libraries), it protects
more permissive parents, as well as all adults, who want to provide for
more unlimited access at home or in other private settings. But the
limitations of the filtering technology raise serious questions about
the effectiveness of the CIPA requirements in enhancing children's
Internet access.
Critics of CIPA argue that the available filtering technology
screens out much nonoffensive material of high social, scientific, and
literary value, and fails to screen out materials, including visual images, that are most likely to offend. While underinclusion should be a
serious concern for the harm-focused regulator, it should be considerably less troubling for the access-focused regulator. Where access is
the aim, parent perception is what matters, and the same confidence
that inspires legislators to call (presumably with constituent support)
for filters is likely to inspire parents to feel comfortable with the filtering mechanism as well.
Overregulation, however, is a serious problem for access-focused
regulators. To state the obvious, the more the Internet's value to children is reduced by overfiltering, the less we can justify such regulations as access enhancing. We might be particularly concerned about
this loss of valuable Internet information to children, who are less
likely to understand the filtering mechanism and therefore more
likely to assume that what they cannot access does not, in fact, exist.
While the Supreme Court concluded that the problem of overfiltering was negligible, for adults, because they could ask the block to
be removed, this same opportunity is not available to children. A
court reviewing CIPA for its access-enhancing effects on children
might well conclude that overfiltering seriously compromised that
effect.
CONCLUSION

The Internet offers children a unique opportunity to explore
ideas and information with independence. But parental concerns
about the ready accessibility of materials widely viewed as inappropriate for children threatens to curtail or prevent this independent
exploration. Regulations designed to protect children from these
most offensive materials can be expected to inspire parents to relax
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their control over their children's access. Thus, protective regulations
may, in fact, be speech enhancing for children.
While it is tempting to advocate, as Etzioni has, that the effect of
these regulations should be confined to the users the regulations aim
to benefit, such an approach is likely to undervalue children's speech.
Children need adults to help protect their speech interests because
they are powerless in the legislative process and less attended to by
the courts. Legislation crafted with less opposition from First
Amendment champions, and reviewed by the courts without concern
for adult speech impact, will, predictably, leave children with considerably less access. While Etzioni suggests that communitarian values
will be served by segregating the community's protection of children
from adults' exercise of their rights, it seems more in keeping with
those values to impose some burden on adults to serve the collective
access good of all.

